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SUMMARY 
 
In terms of section 193 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, there are basically 
three remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice, namely reinstatement, 
re-employment and compensation. In disputes of unfair labour practice an arbitrator 
may determine a dispute on terms that the arbitrator deems reasonable, including the 
abovementioned three remedies. For example, in an unfair labour practice dispute 
relating to promotion or appointment, an arbitrator may order that the process of 
appointment be started afresh, if is found that the process was flawed. 
 
The right to fair labour practice is a right that is enjoyed by everyone and it is a right 
upon which every employee enjoys not to be unfairly dismissed is entrenched in 
section 23 of the Bill of Rights. The rights of every employee contained in the Labour 
Relations Act give content and effect to the right to fair labour practice contained in 
section 23 of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Every trade union, employer’s organisation and employer has a right to engage in 
collective bargaining, which includes but not limited to the formulation of disciplinary 
policies in the workplace, which should be observed by every employee. Our 
constitution mandates the Legislature to enact legislation that regulates collective 
bargaining. 
 
One of the purpose of our Labour Relations Act is to promote collective bargaining 
and the effective resolution of labour disputes. The remedies for unfair dismissal and 
unfair labour practice therefore give content and effect to the purpose of the Act, 
which is to promote effective resolution of labour disputes. The Legislature has given 
a legislative and policy framework, in terms of which the labour disputes may be 
resolved. 
 
In order to restrict the powers of the arbitrators and courts, section 193 of the Act 
provides that in ordering the reinstatement and re-employment of dismissed 
employee, they must exercise a discretion to order reinstatement re-employment, not 
earlier than the date of dismissal. 
 
 iii 
 
The remedy of compensation is an alternative remedy, which must be ordered if the 
circumstances set out in section 193(2)(a) to (d) are applicable. Some arbitrators 
have made a mistake of treating this remedy as part of the primary remedies. 
However, our courts have clarified the intention of the Legislature in crafting the 
remedies for unfair dismissal. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice have always been part of 
our labour law since the times of the Industrial Court.  Our law of unfair dismissal was 
previously governed by the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 where the old Industrial 
Court was vested with powers to determine unfair labour practice dispute on such 
terms as it may deem reasonable, including but not limited to the ordering of 
reinstatement or compensation. 
 
Our law of unfair dismissal was codified through the enactment of the Labour 
Relation Act 66 of 1995. The Industrial Court’s jurisprudence was and is still very 
useful in some areas of law of unfair dismissal in order to interpret our labour law, 
and in particular, the remedies for unfair dismissal. The enactment of the new Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 was meant to give effect to the right to fair labour practice 
entrenched in section 23 of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
 
With the advent of a democratic era, our courts and tribunals or forums were 
enjoined when interpreting any legislation, and when developing common law or 
customary law, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This 
constitutional obligation upon our courts and tribunals when interpreting any 
legislation was also applied in the labour law sphere. In the beginning of the new 
Labour Relations Act, it was a challenge for our courts to give judgments which 
created certainty in the remedies for unfair dismissal.  For example, before the 2002 
amendments, there was a distinction between the award of compensation for 
substantive and procedural unfairness of a dismissal, which had an effect of 
compensating an unfairly dismissed employee for more than the maximum statutory 
period of 12 months. 
 
The confusion created by section 194(1) and (2) in awarding compensation 
necessitated some legislative amendments to the section in order to create certainty 
on how to calculate compensation for dismissals that are substantively and 
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procedurally unfair. A history on the remedies for unfair dismissal will be outlined in 
Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3 the court’s interpretation of the remedies for unfair 
dismissal will be discussed in order to give an idea on how the industrial relations 
players have to organise their business, and thereby give content to the constitutional 
right to give fair labour practice. 
 
Basically, my discussion will focus on the primary remedies for unfair dismissal, 
namely reinstatement and re-employment, as well as the remedy of compensation, 
which is applicable in situations that are set out in section 193(2) of the Act. The 
discussion will be concluded with the evaluation of the legislative framework on the 
remedies for unfair dismissal and the court’s present interpretation of the same. 
 
It will be demonstrated, through recent case law on how the courts have adopted a 
proper approach for the interpretation of the provisions of the remedies for unfair 
dismissal. It will also be demonstrated, through the use of case law, which factors 
must be taken into consideration when an arbitrator or a court formulates an award of 
compensation. In assessing a proper amount of damages to be awarded, one has to 
exercise discretion in a judicial manner and the award of compensation must be just 
and equitable. 
 
It is important to note that the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 also makes provision 
for remedies for the residual unfair labour practice, and they include but not limited to 
reinstatement, re-employment or compensation. The unfair labour practice disputes 
are disputes of right, which flow the contract of employment, collective agreements 
and statute, which aggrieved parties can refer to the CCMA or a council, if parties to 
the dispute fall within the registered scope of that council. It will be demonstrated, 
how the courts have distinguished between the disputes of rights and disputes about 
matters of mutual interest in determining unfair labour practice disputes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR DISMISAL 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In understanding the general principles relating to the remedies for unfair dismissal, a 
brief historical background will be discussed first, in order to show how the labour law 
dispensation has evolved since the 1979 amendments. 
 
A discussion will also be made about the Industrial Court’s jurisprudence on the 
remedies of the unfair labour practices, which regulated the employment law disputes 
until the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
 
This chapter will be concluded by outlining the impact of the 2002 amendments on 
the remedies for unfair dismissal.  
 
2.2 1979 AMENDMENTS 
 
In 1973, the black workers engaged in a wave of strikes as they were no longer 
prepared to accept their secondary status in the industry.  In the same year, the 
government passed a Black Labour Relations Regulations Act.  This Act provided for 
the establishment of the liaison committees at plant level, as alternative to the 
already existing workers committees. 
 
By 1976 it had become obvious that the provision of the Black Labour Relations Act 
of 1973 had not solved the problems of black worker militancy.  
 
The threat of sanctions and disinvestment had increased and various codes of 
employment and various codes of employment practice (notably the EEC Code, the 
Sullivan Code and the British Code of Employment Practice) had been issued to 
multinational companies in South Africa. An improved image was sorely needed, and 
it was in this climate that the government in 1977 appointed the Commission of 
Inquiry into Labour Legislation, commonly known as the Wiehahn Commission. The 
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original brief of the commission was to rationalise the then existent labour legislation, 
to seek possible means of adapting the industrial relations system to changing needs 
and to eliminate bottlenecks and other problems experienced in the labour sphere. 
 
Many of the recommendations of the Commission were accepted and implemented 
by the government, thus substantially changing South African labour legislation. The 
Wiehahn Commission’s first report was certainly the most momentous and the 
legislation which followed brought about the most radical changes in labour relations. 
The report recommended, inter alia, that: 
 
• full freedom of association be granted to all employees regardless of race, sex 
or creed; 
 
• trade union, irrespective of composition in terms of colour, race or sex, be 
allowed to register; 
 
• stricter criteria be adopted for trade union registration; 
 
• a system of financial inspection of trade union be introduced; 
 
• prohibitions on political activity by unions be extended; 
 
• liaison committees be renamed as work councils; 
 
• where no industrial council had jurisdiction, work councils and workers 
committees be granted full collective bargaining rights; 
 
• statutory job reservation be phased out; 
 
• safeguards be introduced to protect minorities previously protected by job 
reservation; 
 
• the Industrial Tribunal be replaced by the Industrial Court; 
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• fair employment practices be developed by the Industrial Court; 
 
• job reservation be phased out, with the consent of those concerned; 
 
• allowance for a closed shop be maintained; and 
 
• a tripartite National Manpower Commission be established. 
 
An exposition of section 43 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (prior to repeal by 
Act 66 of 1995) will also be made below. 
 
“43. Power of court to order reinstatement of employees or restoration of 
terms and conditions of employment or abstention from unfair labour 
practice. 
 
(1) In this section, the term ‘dispute’ means a dispute concerning an alleged 
unfair labour practice.  
 
 (Sub-s. (1) substituted by s.15(a) of Act 83 of 1988.)   
 
(2) Any party to a dispute who: 
 
(a) refers the dispute to an industrial council having jurisdiction in respect 
of the dispute; or 
 
(b) if there is no industrial council having jurisdiction, applies under 
section 35(1) for the establishment of a conciliation board in respect of 
the dispute, 
 
may within 10 days of the date of such reference or application apply by 
means of an affidavit to the industrial court for an order under 
subsection(4). 
 
(Sub-s. (2) amended by s.15(b) of act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(3) (a) Whenever an application for an order is made in terms of subsection 
(2) the applicant shall at the same time furnish proof to the satisfaction 
of the industrial court that a copy of the application has been sent by 
registered post or delivered to the other party or parties to the dispute, 
and if there is an industrial council having jurisdiction in respect of the 
dispute, to the secretary of that council. 
 
(b)  The party or parties and the industrial council (if any) referred to in 
paragraph (a) may within 14 days of the date on which the application 
was posted or delivered by hand or such further period or periods as 
the industrial court may from time to time either before or after the 
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expiry of any such period fix, submit an affidavit sent by registered 
post or delivered by hand to the industrial court in regard thereto and 
shall send by registered post or deliver by hand to the applicant a 
copy thereof, and the applicant may within10 days from the date on 
which the affidavit was posted or delivered or such  further period or 
periods as the industrial court may from time to time fix, by means of 
an affidavit reply thereto. 
 
 (Para.(b) substituted by s.15(c) of Act 83 of 1988) 
 
(c)  The provisions of section 45(a) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
parties to the dispute at proceedings before the industrial court in 
pursuance of an application under subsection (2) of this section. 
 
(4) (a) Unless the industrial court on good cause shown decides otherwise, 
no order may be made under this subsection if the relevant 
application under subsection (2) was not made within 30 days of the 
date on which notice was given of the alleged unfair labour practice or 
if no such notice was given, of the date on which the alleged unfair 
labour practice was introduced. 
 
(Para. (a) substituted by s.15(d) of Act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(b) After considering – 
 
(i) whether the application has complied with the relevant 
provisions of this section; 
 
(ii) the facts set out in the application and the affidavits as 
contemplated in subsection (3)(b); 
 
(iii)  any oral representation or evidence allowed by the industrial 
court; 
 
(iv)  whether the applicant has in good faith endeavoured to settle 
the dispute by agreement or otherwise; and 
 
(v)  whether it is expedient to grant an order in terms of this section, 
 
(NB: In terms of s.2 of the Agricultural Labour Act 147 of 1993, for the 
purposes of s.1 of Act 147 of 1993, this Act must be constructed as if 
a sub-para. (iv) had been added. For the wording of sub-para-(vi) see 
‘LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 28 OF 1956 AS TO BE CONSTRUED IN 
TERMS OF THE AGRICULTURAL LABOUR ACT 147 OF 1993’ 
immediately below this Act.) 
 
The industrial court may make such order as it deems reasonable in 
the circumstances: Provided that no party may be ordered to pay 
damages of whatever nature and the court may at any time, on the 
application of any party, in respect of which application the provisions 
of subsection (3) shall apply, withdraw or vary any such order. 
 
(Para. (b) Substituted by s15(e) of Act 83 of 1988.) 
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(c) The industrial court shall not make any order as to cost in respect of 
any proceeding brought before it under this section, save on the 
ground of unreasonableness or frivolity on the part of a party to a 
relevant dispute. 
 
(5)  When making an order under subsection (4) the industrial court shall fix the 
date from which the order shall operate and may make it retrospective to a 
date not earlier than that on which the alleged unfair labour practice was 
introduced. 
 
(Sub-s5 substitute by s.15(f) of Act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(6) An order made by the industrial court under subsection (4) shall prevail   
over any contrary provisions in any law or wage regulating measure and 
shall, unless it is withdrawn sooner, remain operative- 
 
(a) until the dispute has been settled by the industrial council or the 
conciliation board concerned or, if it is referred or is required to be 
referred to arbitration or to the industrial court for determination, by an 
award or determination, as the case may be; or  
 
(b) until the secretary of the industrial council or chairman of the 
conciliation board concerned informs the industrial court that the 
industrial council or the conciliation board, as the case may be, failed 
to settle the dispute and has decided not to refer the dispute to an 
arbitrator or to arbitrators and an umpire or to the industrial court, 
 
whichever event occurs first: Provided that no such order shall remain 
operative for longer than 90 days from the date of commencement fixed by 
the industrial court under subsection (5), unless the industrial court, taking 
into consideration the steps taken by the parties to settle the dispute, of its 
own motion or on application extends that period by periods not exceeding 
30 days at a time. 
 
(Sub-s.(6) substituted by s.15(g) of Act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(7) If an order is made not to suspend or terminate the employment of an 
employee, or if such suspension or termination has already occurred, to 
rescind the suspension or to reinstate an employee, an employer who pays 
to an employee the remuneration which would have been due to the 
employee in respect of his normal hours  of work had his employment not 
been suspended or terminated or lesser remuneration as the industrial 
court may determine taking cognizance of any remuneration to which the 
employee has in the meantime become entitled by virtue of work performed 
by such employee, shall be deemed to have complied with the order. 
 
(Sub-s.(7) substituted by s.15(h)of Act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(8)  If an arbitrator or arbitrators and an umpire to whom the matter is referred in 
terms of this Act or the labour appeal court or the industrial court, confirms 
the suspension or termination or the decision or proposal which gave rise to 
the dispute, any employer  who under the provisions of subsection (7) has 
paid any remuneration to an employee in satisfaction of an order made 
under subsection (4) in respect of the same matter shall be entitled to 
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recover the remuneration so paid from the employee by civil legal 
proceedings. 
 
(Sub-s.(8) substituted by s.15(i) of Act 83 of 1988.) 
 
(9)  The industrial court may refuse to grant an application made in terms of 
subsection (2), but may permit the applicant to make use of any documents 
on which that application was based, in applying to the industrial court for 
an order under subsection (4).   
 
(S.43 amended s.7 of Act 41 of 1959, by s.13 of Act 94 of 1979 and by s.7 
of Act 95 of 1980 and substituted by s.8 of Act 51 of 1982.) 
 
Having laid down the provisions of section 43 of the old Labour Relations Act 28 of 
1956, the discussion to follow will deal with the industrial court’s jurisprudence on the 
determination of unfair labour practices and remedies thereof. 
 
2.3 INDUSTRIAL COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Section 46(9)(c) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (as amended) provided that: 
 
“the industrial court shall as soon as possible after receipt of the reference in 
terms of paragraph (b), determine the dispute on such terms as it may deem 
reasonable, including but not limited to the ordering of reinstatement or 
compensation, and the provisions of section 49 to 58, 62 and 71 shall mutatis 
mutandis apply in respect of any determination made in terms of this subsection 
in so far  as such provisions can be applied: Provided that such determination 
may include any alleged unfair labour practice which is substantially 
contemplated by the referral to the industrial council or with the terms of 
reference of the conciliation board determined in terms of section 35 (3)(b)”. 
 
Advocate NF Rautenbach discussed in his article on “Remedying Procedural 
Unfairness: An Employer’s Dilemma”.1  The problems which could face employers 
from time to time as illustrated by the decision of MAWU v Henred Freuhauf Trailers.2
                                                 
1  (1990) 11 ILJ 466. 
2  (1988) 9 ILJ 488 (IC). 
 
The applicant employee was dismissed on 2 February 1987, but thereafter reinstated 
on 10 February 1987 with retrospective effect to the date of dismissal. The employee 
was then suspended on full pay pending a fresh disciplinary enquiry. An enquiry was 
held on 11 February and this resulted in the termination of the employee’s services. 
The matter was then referred to an industrial council which failed to resolve the 
dispute. The dismissal complained about was that of that of 2 February and not the 
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later one on 11 February. In an application in terms of section 46(9) of the Labour 
Relations Act, the respondent employer raised a special plea that the dispute 
concerning the dismissal of 2 February had been determined by the reinstatement of 
the applicant on 10 February. 
 
The court held that it was abundantly clear that by reinstating Maake (the applicant) 
on 10 February dispute relating to the dismissal on 2 February was resolved. The 
court found that the reinstatement was not a sham because the applicant was 
remunerated for the interim period and participated in the subsequent enquiry. 
 
Advocate Rautenbach stated that the ratio of the decision of Landman AM was that 
the court cannot make a determination where the dispute has been resolved by a 
settlement or by a party rescinding its action so totally and completely as was done in 
this case. The court also held that the applicant’s papers could not be amended to 
include an allegation that the dispute concerned the dismissal on 11 February, 
because this dispute had not been referred to the industrial council even though both 
dismissals were for the same reason. Accordingly, the applicant was not entitled to 
any relief. 
 
In Van Dyk v Markly Investments,3
It appears that the rationale of the principle laid down is Van Dyk
 Bulbulia M was called upon to decide a dispute in 
which an employee was reinstated without a disclosure by the employer that it 
intended to hold a disciplinary enquiry. The court found that the employer had neither 
‘played open cards’ with the employee nor made a genuine attempt to settle the 
dispute. The court accordingly reinstated the applicant. This decision, according to 
Adv Rautenbach, suggested that there are two requirements for an offer of 
reinstatement to resolve a dispute. Firstly, the employer must play “open cards” and 
be frank with the employee on the terms of the reinstatement. Secondly, genuine 
agreement between the parties is a prerequisite for determination of the dispute. 
 
4
                                                 
3  (1988) 9 ILJ 918 (IC). 
4  Supra. 
 was that the 
employer was entitled to reinstate the employee, subject to the right to continue with 
a disciplinary enquiry on the same dispute. 
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What is apparent from the Industrial Court’s approach is that the court could order 
reinstatement of an employee, where the employer did not follow a fair procedure, 
even though the employer had good reason to dismiss the employee. 
 
In Towels, Edgar Jacobs Ltd v The President of the Industrial Court,5
Advocate JG Van Der Riet stated in his article on the “Reinstatement of Unfairly 
Dismissed Employees”
 it was stated 
that the employment of particular employees, whether they form part of an 
identifiable group or not, can be said to be a labour practice. To reinstate them is to 
“restore the labour practice” that existed prior to their dismissal within the 
contemplation of section 43(4)(b)(iii) of the Act. To retrench employees by simply 
giving them the required notice of termination of their service contracts is conduct 
such as falls within the ambit of the definition of unfair labour practice. 
 
In this case an interdict was sought and granted, as an interim measure, against the 
continuation of part-heard proceedings before the industrial court in terms of section 
46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (“the LRA”).  The applicant, without 
filing any papers on the merits of the application, challenged jurisdiction of the 
industrial court before that tribunal. The challenge failed at a preliminary hearing 
arranged by the parties. The deputy president of the court dismissed the objection to 
the jurisdiction. He ordered the respondent (the present applicant) to give notice of its 
intention to oppose the section 46 (9) application and to deliver a statement of its 
defence in terms of rule 6(2)(b) within the time prescribed by the rules of the 
industrial court. 
 
The court found that the dispute between the parties was one involving an unfair 
labour practice; it was competent for the industrial council to refer this dispute to the 
industrial court and it properly did so. The interim order was accordingly discharged. 
 
6
                                                 
5  (1986) 7 ILJ 496 (C). 
6  (1994) 15 ILJ 1238. 
 that it was accepted that the power of the Industrial Court to 
determine disputes concerning an alleged unfair labour practice included the 
competency to determine unfair dismissals. He stated that if an employee who was 
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found to have been dismissed unfairly sought to retain the job that he or she had 
been unfairly deprived of, then the only practical way to protect and enhance job 
security was to reinstate the employee. Or to put it differently, if unfairly dismissed 
employees who wanted their jobs back, were given remedies other than 
reinstatement by the labour courts, job security would not had been enhanced  by the 
unfair dismissal jurisdiction of the labour courts. 
 
In Cremack v SACWU7 the court confirmed the view, “that if an unfair dismissal 
appears, the inference is that fairness demands a reinstatement”. The court referred 
to a number of Labour Appeal Court decisions, which were based on the dictum of 
Goldstein J in Sentraal-Wes (Kooperatief) Beperk v FAWU8
In Performing Arts Council of the Transvaal v Paper Printing Wood and Allied 
Workers Union,
 where the learned judge 
stated “prima facie, if an unfair dismissal occurs, the inference is that fairness 
demands reinstatement. And it is for an employer to raise the factors which displace 
such inference”.   
 
9 the issue came squarely before the Appellate Division for the first 
time. The employees in this case were dismissed because they had engaged in an 
unlawful strike. The majority of court held that the dismissal constituted an unfair 
labour practice in the circumstances of the case and that reinstatement was the 
appropriate relief in the matter.10  Goldstone JA (who wrote the majority judgment) 
stated that the dictum of Goldstein J in the Sentraal-Wes case was “far too widely 
stated”. He was of the view that “a rule of thumb, even if applied on a prima facie 
basis, will tend to fetter the wide discretion of the Industrial Court (or the Labour 
Appeal Court)”.11
In NUMSA v Henred Fruehauf Trailers,
 
 
12
                                                 
7  (1994) 15 ILJ 289 (LAC). 
8  (1990) 11 ILJ 977 (LAC) at 994E-F. 
9  (1994) 15 ILJ 65 (A). 
10  At 79D. 
11  At 78B. 
12  (1994) 15 ILJ 1257 (A). 
 the Appellate Division was asked to set 
aside a Labour Appeal Court decision refusing the reinstatement of unfairly 
dismissed workers. Nicholas AJA (who wrote the judgment) considered the judgment 
of Goldstone JA in the Performing Arts Council of Transvaal case. Without expressly 
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stating whether he approved of the criticism of Goldstein J, he concluded as 
follows:13
2.4 REMEDIES IN TERMS OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
 
 
“Where an employee is unfairly dismissed he suffers a wrong.  Fairness and 
justice require that such wrong should be redressed.  The Act provides that the 
redress may consist of reinstatement, compensation or otherwise.  The fullest 
redress obtainable is provided by the restoration of the status quo ante.  It follows 
that it is incumbent on the court when deciding what remedy is appropriate to 
consider whether in light of all the proved circumstances there is reason to refuse 
reinstatement.” 
 
The learned judge found on the facts and circumstances before the Appellate 
Division, that reinstatement was the appropriate relief and the decision of the labour 
Appeal Court was set aside. 
 
 
After the 1994 election the reconstituted Department of Manpower, now renamed the 
Department of Labour commenced putting its stamp on the labour relation system. A 
task team was established to draft a new Labour Relations Act and in February 1995, 
the first draft Negotiation Document was published for comment. 
 
On 11 November 1996 the new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was passed into law 
and it overhauled the old Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and codified the law of 
unfair dismissal. 
 
Of relevance for purposes of this discussion are sections 193, 194 and 195, which 
were enacted as follows: 
 
“193 Remedies for unfair dismissal 
 
(1) If the Labour Court or an arbitrator appointed in terms of this Act finds that a 
dismissal is unfair, the Court or the arbitrator may – 
 
(a) order the employer to reinstate the employee from any date not earlier 
than the date of dismissal; 
 
(b) order the employer to re-employ the employee either in the work in 
which the employee was employed before the dismissal or in other 
                                                 
13  At 1263C-D. 
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reasonably suitable work on any terms and from any date not earlier 
than the date of dismissal; or 
 
(c) order the employer to pay compensation to the employee. 
 
(2) The Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate or 
re-employ the employee unless – 
 
(a) the employee does not wish to be reinstated or re-employed; 
 
(b) the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a 
continued employment relationship would be intolerable; 
 
(c) it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate or re-
employ the employee; or 
 
(d) the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair 
procedure. 
 
(3) If a dismissal is automatically unfair or, if a dismissal based on the 
employer’s operational requirements is found to be unfair, the Labour Court 
in addition may make any other order that it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
 
194 Limits on compensation 
 
(1) If a dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair 
procedure, compensation must be equal to the remuneration that the 
employee would have been paid between the date of dismissal and the last 
day of the hearing of the arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be, 
calculated at the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
Compensation may however not be awarded in respect of any 
unreasonable period of delay that was caused by the employee in initiating 
or prosecuting a claim. 
 
(2) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is found to be 
unfair because the employer did not prove that the reason for dismissal was 
a fair reason related to the employee’s conduct, capacity or based on the 
employer’s operational requirements, must be just and equitable in all the 
circumstances, but not less than the amount specified in subsection (1), 
and not more than the equivalent of 12 months remuneration calculated at 
the employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
 
(3) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is 
automatically unfair must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but 
not more than the equivalent of 24 months’ remuneration calculated at the 
employee’s rate of remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
 
195 Compensation is in addition to any other amount 
 
An order or award of compensation made in terms of this Chapter is in addition 
to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to which the employee is entitled in 
terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employment.” 
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In Matthews v Hutchinson,14
In Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd,
 the applicant employee had been charged and found 
guilty of negligent conduct relating to the third respondent store’s cash float count 
sheet.  She was dismissed.  The CCMA found that the dismissal was fair. 
 
The court, having considered the evidence, found that the cumulative effect of the 
misdirections of the commissioner amounted to a gross irregularity and failure of 
justice. The commissioner did not apply his mind to the evidence and the subtle 
nuances of the evidence. He misunderstood the import of the evidence and attributed 
motives to the employee which could not reasonably be drawn. He also relied on 
suspect evidence.  The court accordingly set aside the award and replaced the 
sanction of dismissal with a final written warning. It also ordered the employee to 
make good the loss of R5 000 to the store. 
 
15
It should be noted that the dismissed employees finally approached the 
Constitutional Court for an order declaring that their dismissal was procedurally unfair 
and for an order for reinstatement. The court dismissed the employee’s application 
for leave to appeal in Xinwa v Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd.
 the court held that the remedy of 
reinstatement is not appropriate where the dismissal was substantively fair but 
procedurally unfair. The court, however, found that the employee’s dismissal was 
both substantively and procedurally fair. 
 
16
It was widely accepted that the all or nothing approach with regard to compensation 
led to injustice.  The courts were often reluctant to deny applicants any compensation 
for a procedurally unfair dismissal, yet feel it would be even more unjust to the 
employer to award the full amount of the compensation prescribed in section 194(1) 
for a procedurally unfair dismissal.  In Fourie v Iscor Ltd,
 
 
17
                                                 
14  (1998) 19 ILJ 1512 (LC). 
15  (2001) 22 ILJ 1575 (LAC). 
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 the court held that it was 
“of the view that the applicants should not be lightly denied compensation for a 
procedurally unfair dismissal”. This view was echoed by Damont AJ in the Scribante 
case, where he held that “the court should not lightly deprive applicants who have 
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been the victims of procedural unfairness of compensation. It may be that the amount 
of compensation is high, but that is a matter for the legislature to consider”.18
2.5 2002 AMENDMENTS 
 
 
It is against this background of ambiguity caused by subsections 194(1) and (2) that 
led to the legislature’s amendments in 2002, which will be discussed below, including 
the court’s application and interpretation of the amendments. 
 
 
Section 193 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was amended by the addition of 
subsection 4 which provides as follows: 
 
“An arbitrator appointed in terms of this Act may determine any unfair labour 
practice dispute referred to the arbitrator, on terms that the arbitrator deems 
reasonable, which may include ordering reinstatement, re-employment or 
compensation.” 
 
Subsection 194(1) was substituted by section 48(a) of Act 12 of 2002 as follows: 
 
“The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is found to be 
unfair either because the employer did not prove that the reason for dismissal is 
a fair reason relating to the employee’s conduct or capacity or the employer’s 
operational requirements or the employer did not follow a fair procedure, or both, 
must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but may not be more than the 
equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration calculated at the employee’s rate of 
remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
 
Subsection 194(2) was deleted by section 52(b) of Act 12 of 2002. 
 
Subsection 194(4) was added by section 48(a) of Act 12 of 2002 as follows: 
 
“The compensation awarded to an employee in respect of an unfair labour 
practice must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than 
the equivalent of 12 months’ remuneration.” 
 
                                                 
18  At para 5.4. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The law of unfair dismissal has evolved since the days of the Industrial Court 
jurisprudence until the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the 
2002 amendments. From the period of 1980 to date, our courts have assisted in the 
application and interpretation of the law of unfair dismissal, thereby giving some 
guidance on the industrial relations players on how to apply the law of unfair 
dismissal. 
 
At times, it was difficult for our courts to redress the wrongs caused by an unfair 
dismissal to individual employees due to the powers conferred upon them by the 
labour laws of the day. However, as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 was new to 
most of the industrial relations players, the courts awarded judgments which did not 
give clarity on how to deal with certain disputes arising from unfair dismissal. That 
necessitated some amendments to the law of unfair dismissal in order to enhance 
the labour relations system by promoting job security, labour peace and advance 
economic development of the enterprises. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERPRETATION OF THE REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the three remedies for unfair dismissal as 
set out in section 193 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. These remedies are 
reinstatement, re-employment or compensation. 
 
The ways in which these remedies are couched in section 193 means that 
reinstatement and re-employment are primary remedies for unfair dismissal. The 
remedy of compensation is normally applied when the exceptions in subsection 2 (a) 
to (d) are applicable.  
 
It will also be demonstrated, through the decided cases, how the remedies for unfair 
dismissal have been interpreted in order to give certainty to the labour relations 
system. 
 
3.2 REINSTATEMENT 
 
Section 193(2) makes it clear that reinstatement is the preferred remedy for unfairly 
dismissed employees, and that compensation should be granted instead only when 
one or more of the exceptions mentioned in paragraph (a) to (d) apply. When those 
do apply reinstatement cannot be ordered. When determining whether the exceptions 
apply, the commissioner must do so on the basis of evidence, not mere speculation. 
 
If an arbitrator or the Labour Court finds that an employee has been unfairly 
dismissed, the employee may be reinstated from a date not earlier than the date of 
dismissal or the employer may be ordered to re-employ the employee in the work in 
which the employee was employed at the time of his or her dismissal or in other 
reasonably suitable work on any terms and from any date not earlier than the date of 
dismissal. 
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The difference between reinstatement and re-employment is not explained. 
Reinstatement, in its ordinary meaning suggests that the period of service between 
dismissal and resumption of service in deemed unbroken; re-employment that the 
employment contract ended at the date of dismissal and resumed on the date of re-
employment. In the vast majority of cases, unfairly dismissed employees who are 
returned to work are granted reinstatement. It seems that re-employment was offered 
as an alternative to dismissal to cater for forms of dismissal, in which the employment 
relationship had terminated before the dismissal, ie where the employee was the 
victim of selective non-re-employment or where the employer refused to renew a 
seasonal contact. 
 
The term “reinstatement” also suggests that an order of reinstatement may not be 
conditional or coupled with any qualification, other than something less than full 
retrospectivity. Although the LRA does not empower arbitrators to impose a penalty 
on dismissed employees, in practice commissioners frequently reinstate employees 
on warnings.  This was held permissible in County Fair v CCMA.19  The court also 
appeared to confirm that commissioners have the power impose penalties short of 
dismissal in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA.20
An order of reinstatement does not operate in perpetuity, in the sense that it 
precludes the employer from later transferring or altering the working arrangements 
of the employee in accordance with its contractual rights. Thus, in Jeremiah v 
National Sorghum Breweries,
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 the employee complained that the employer had 
breached the terms of the reinstatement order by proposing to transfer him to 
another area of its operation and giving him a different vehicle. The court observed 
that an order of reinstatement does not deprive the employer of its pre-existing rights 
to re-deploy the employee or amend his working conditions in accordance with the 
original contract.  
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In CTL Group (Pty) Ltd v Memela,22
Implicit in the judgment in Ntombela v Hewidge Hire & Haul CC
 the CCMA awarded reinstatement with effect 
from 15 April 2002 and back pay in the amount of R25 718 to the first respondent 
employee. The applicant employer raised a preliminary point that the employee was 
not entitled to any payment for the period 15 April 2002 to the date when the Labour 
Court made the award an order of court or until the employee was physically 
reinstated. 
 
The court noted that the effect of the employer’s submission, if it were to be 
accepted, would be to permit an employer who has defied an award or order of the 
court to profit from it. The court stated that could not be tolerated as the orders for 
payment for the period between the date of the award or the date on which the award 
orders reinstatement and the date of the order of the Labour Court had been 
regularly granted by the court without debate.  
 
23
In Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd v CCMA
 was the acceptance 
that there may be a monetary remedy over and above the contempt remedy available 
to an employee who is deprived of physical reinstatement in terms of valid award and 
order of the court. The court dismissed the preliminary point with cost. 
 
It would appear that the employer failed to comply with the arbitration award until the 
same was made an order of court in terms of section 158(1)(c) of the Labour 
Relations Act and it wanted to benefit by defying the award or order of court from 15 
April 2002 to the date until the Labour Court made the award an order of court.  That 
could never have been the intention of the Legislature to deprive the employee his or 
her backpay where the contract of employment had been restored. 
 
24
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 the applicant company sought to review an 
award of the CCMA reinstating the fourth respondent employee retrospectively to the 
date of his dismissal.  It appeared that the employee had been absent from 4 
January to 7 March 2000.  In his absence the company conducted a disciplinary 
hearing into his absence without leave, and dismissed him in absentia.  When the 
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employee returned to work on 7 March a second disciplinary enquiry was held and 
he was found guilty of absence from work without leave and failing to inform his 
employer of his whereabouts, and was dismissed again.  It appeared, however, that 
the employee was in prison from 23 December 1999 until his return to work in March 
2000.   
 
The commissioner found that the initial disciplinary hearing was procedurally unfair 
because the company had dismissed the employee in his absence well knowing that 
he was in prison.  The commissioner rejected the company's denial of its knowledge 
of his whereabouts during his absence.  The commissioner accepted that the 
employee had given a reasonable explanation for not contacting the company while 
he was in prison.  The commissioner also considered the employee's clean 
disciplinary record, and length of service and noted that as the company had offered 
to re-employ the employee if a vacancy arose, the employment relationship had not 
been destroyed.   
 
The court failed to find anything wrong with the commissioner's finding that the 
dismissal had been substantially unfair.  Furthermore, disciplining the employee for 
misconduct for a second time after he had returned to work with a valid explanation 
was unfair. 
 
The court found, however, that the commissioner had failed to take into account that 
imprisonment suspended the obligation of the employer to pay the employee a salary 
for the period of his imprisonment.  Remuneration should not had been granted for 
the period January, February up to 7 March 200.  The court accordingly upheld the 
award subject to the deduction of the remuneration paid for the above period from 
the compensation award.   
 
The above case illustrates an important point for employers when they are faced with 
cases involving employees who are absent without leave as a result of imprisonment.  
This case guides employers intending to institute disciplinary action to afford the 
employees an opportunity to explain why they did not contact their employer to 
advise it about its whereabouts. 
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However, a balance is struck between the rights of employees and the rights of 
employers by stating that they employers are not obliged to remunerate the 
employees during the period that they were in prison and not tendering their services 
to the employer. 
 
On the other hand, a termination of the employment contract of an employee who is 
in prison may be done by operation of law, as it is the case in the public sector, 
where an employee is deemed to have deserted his employment after 30 days.  
 
In New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA,25
                                                 
25  (2008) 29 ILJ 1972 (LC). 
 the court was asked to determine the 
application and interpretation of section 193(2)(b), where following their dismissal for 
misconduct, the respondent employees approached the CCMA which ruled that their 
dismissal had been substantively unfair and ordered their retrospective 
reinstatement.  The applicant company sought to review the award on the ground 
that it was not reasonable and that the remedy of reinstatement was inappropriate 
regard being had to section 193(2)(b) of the Act.  It also objected to the incomplete 
record on review. 
 
The company argued that the commissioner, when determining whether 
reinstatement was the appropriate remedy, ought to have given consideration to the 
company’s statement that it did not trust the employees and in such circumstances 
section 193(2)(b) precluded the commissioner from reinstating the employees. 
 
The court did not agree with the company.  In the court’s view in all matters relating 
to dismissal for alleged misconduct employers will immediately lose trust in the 
employee the minute the employee faces disciplinary proceedings.  If section 
193(2)(b) were to be interpreted to mean that because at one stage the employer 
had a strong suspicion that an employee was guilty of misconduct that rendered 
continued employment intolerable, then the primary remedy of reinstatement would 
never be afforded to an employee dismissed for misconduct.  The section had to be 
interpreted to mean that evidence had to be led to substantiate the fact that 
continued employment would be intolerable. 
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The court found that, given the fact that reinstatement is the primary remedy, a 
commissioner should invoke the provisions of section 193(2)(b) to deny 
reinstatement sparingly and only after careful consideration of all the circumstances.  
The court accordingly dismissed the review application with costs. 
 
I will now deal with the subject of retrospective reinstatement, which has divided our 
Labour Courts and Labour Appeal Court for some time until the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and finally the Constitutional Court gave certainty on the subject to give 
direction in the labour relations arena.  In Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd,26
After an extensive consideration of the evidence, Zondo JP concluded that some of 
the reasons why the employer brought disciplinary charges against the employee 
related to his union activities.  He was of the view that, where, as in this case, the 
reason or reasons for the dismissal of an employee comprise one or more reasons 
that would render the dismissal automatically unfair and one or more reasons that 
would not render the dismissal automatically unfair, but the reason or reasons that 
 the 
applicant was employed as a pilot by the respondent company.  He was dismissed 
after being found guilty of insubordination and constituting a disruptive influence in 
the operations of the company.  He was at the time of his dismissal, chairperson of 
the Airlines Pilots Association, a trade union.  The employee contended that his 
dismissal was in fact automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(d) of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of the 1995 because he had been dismissed for union activities and 
initiating litigation against the company on behalf of the union.  The Labour Court 
found the employee’s allegation that he had been dismissed for union activities to be 
without merit.  The employee appealed to the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
Although both Zondo JP and Davis AJA concluded that the employee’s dismissal 
was automatically unfair, they adopted different approaches to the manner in which 
automatically unfair dismissals should be considered by the court and the 
retrospectivity of relief granted by the court.   
 
                                                 
26  (2005) 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). 
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would render the dismissal automatically unfair are the dominant reason or reasons, 
the dismissal is automatically unfair.   
 
Regarding relief, Zondo JP noted that, as the employee sought reinstatement and 
none of the situations set out in section 193(2)(a) – (d) existed, the court was obliged 
to order reinstatement.  It was clear from the language of section 193(2) that the 
court had no discretion whether or not to grant reinstatement in such circumstances. 
 
In considering the period of retrospectivity, Zondo JP disagreed with Davis AJ’s view 
that it is competent for the court to make an order of reinstatement that operates with 
retrospective effect up to the date of dismissal even if that goes beyond 24 months in 
cases of automatically unfair dismissals and 12 months in the case of other unfair 
dismissals.  In Zondo JP’s view section 194 caps the amount of compensation 
awardable at an amount equivalent to 24 and 12 months’ remuneration respectively.  
According to Zondo JP section 193 should be construed to mean that an order of 
reinstatement can operate retrospectively to the date of dismissal or up to 24 months 
or 12 months backwards, as the case may be, whichever is the more recent.  He 
stated that this construction would harmonize the provisions of section 193 and 194.   
 
In the case before the court the period between the employee’s date of dismissal and 
the date of delivery of the judgment of the Labour Court was 17 months and was thus 
less than the 24 months contemplated in section 194.  The question the court had to 
decide was whether the reinstatement should operate with retrospective effect to the 
date of dismissal of the employee or to any date or whether it should not be 
retrospective at all. 
 
Zondo JP would ordinarily had been inclined to order that reinstatement operate with 
retrospective effect to the date of dismissal of the employee.  However, he took into 
account the fact that the employee had worked for another air service for five 
months, and the amount he earned during this period had to be deducted from 
whatever compensation or backpay the court ordered.  In addition, Zondo JP noted 
that the employee had been offered another job at the same or a higher salary than 
that paid by the company, but he had refused it because of the litigation pending in 
this matter.  He found that the employee’s decision not to take the job broke the 
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causal connection between his financial loss and the company’s conduct in 
dismissing him as it did.  It was not canvassed in evidence when that job was offered 
to the employee, which made it difficult to determine the period of retrospectivity.  
Zondo JP, however, concluded that he believed that a period of seven months 
retrospectivity would be fair and equitable in the circumstances. 
 
Davis AJA (with whom Wallis JA concurred), noted that there was uncertainty 
concerning the terms and conditions of the alternative employment offered to the 
employee and in order to bring finality to the proceedings, only took account of the 
amount paid to the employee for the five months when he was employed after his 
dismissal, and found that a backdated period of reinstatement of 12 months was just 
and equitable in the circumstances. 
 
In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd,27 Zondo 
JP who gave a minority judgement in Kroukam,28
Following the obiter of Zondo JP on this point in Kroukam,
 after having found the 
retrenchment of the employees to be without a fair reason, then considered the 
appropriate remedy.  The employees sought reinstatement.  Since none of the 
situations provided for in section 193(2)(a) – (d) existed, the court was obliged to 
order reinstatement.  As the employees had been dismissed more than twelve 
months before the Labour Court order ,the court had to decide whether the 
reinstatement order could operate with retrospective effect for a period of more than 
12 months.  
 
29
The court’s discretion to award retrospective reinstatement was thus limited to 12 
months or less.  The court took into account the employee’s failure to take up the 
company’s offer to discuss the use of their services pending the outcome of the 
litigation, and found that this warranted a reduction in the amount of retrospectivity.  
 the court found that it is 
not competent to order the retrospective operation of a reinstatement order in excess 
of 12 months in an ordinary unfair dismissal case. 
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29  Supra. 
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The court found that six month’s retrospectivity to be appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
 
The two conflicting judgements of the Labour Appeal Court in Kroukam and Latex 
caused a lot of uncertainty on retrospective reinstatement and it also divided our 
Labour Courts and labour dispute resolution tribunals for quite some time.   
 
For example in Jaftha v CCMA,30
In National Union of Mineworders v CCMA,
 regarding appropriate relief, the court observed that 
there was no evidence that the working relationship between the employee and the 
company had been damaged or destroyed.  Reinstatement appeared therefore to be 
appropriate.  The employee had been dismissed four years before the hearing.  
Relying on the Labour Appeal Court decision in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v 
Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd on the limitation of retrospective reinstatement 
orders, the court limited the period of retrospectivity to 12 months. 
 
31
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 the CCMA had found the second 
applicant employee’s dismissal by the third respondent employer to be unfair and 
had awarded him compensation.  In an application to review the award the applicants 
contended that the commissioner should have ordered the reinstatement of the 
employee.   
 
An application for condonation accompanied the review application.  At the hearing, 
the employer conceded that, if condonation were granted, the commissioner’s award 
of compensation instead of reinstatement was irrational and therefore reviewable. 
 
Having perused the record, the court was of the view that the commissioner should 
have found that none of the four exceptions referred to in section 193(2) existed.  
The commissioner appeared instead to have introduced a fifth exception, namely that 
the employee was perceived to be a bad person and the relationship between the 
union and the employer was bad, and that as a result of this, reinstatement was not 
the appropriate remedy.  The court found that the commissioner had committed a 
gross irregularity.  He should have ordered the reinstatement of the employee. 
 26 
 
Regarding retrospectivity of the award, the court noted that the crucial date was the 
date on which the award was issued by the commissioner.  This was 7 May 2001, 
about eight months after the employee’s dismissal on 8 September 2000.  The 
commissioner should therefore have reinstated the employee from the date of his 
dismissal, a period which would not have exceeded 12 months.  The court 
accordingly, reviewed and set aside the commissioner’s award and replaced it with 
an order that the employer reinstate the employee from the date of his dismissal. 
 
On examination of the legal position set out in the above case, it appears that the 
period in which to determine whether the reinstatement order would exceed 12 or 24 
months, as the case may be, is the period between the date of dismissal and the 
date of arbitration or adjudication hearing.  It also appears that the court shared the 
same view as Zondo JP in Latex,32
The above two Labour Court judgments of Jaftha and National Union of 
Mineworkers,
 since Francis J stated in paragraph 15 of his 
judgment that “he award was issued on 7 May 2001 which was eight months after the 
dismissal and the backpay would not have exceeded 12 months”  This statement by 
Francis J indicates that had the dismissal been more than 12 months from the date of 
dismissal, backpay on the reinstatement order would not have exceeded 12 months. 
 
33
This legal position was also followed in Laminate Profiles CC v Mompei,
 illustrate the way in which our Labour Courts have been divided on 
the subject of retrospective reinstatement, as the courts followed the principle laid 
down in Latex by Zondo JP.   
 
34
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 where the 
employee had been arrested by the police on 8 March 2001, had been dismissed on 
8 June 2001 when his father informed the employer that he was in prison, and had 
been released from prison on 25 March 2002.  The dismissal dispute was finalized by 
the CCMA on 8 March 2004.  The commissioner had ordered the employer to 
reinstate the employee retrospectively from the date of his dismissal. 
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The court found that because the employee had been in detention from 8 March 
2001 to 25 March 2002, the commissioner should have found that imprisonment 
suspended the obligation on the employer to pay him a salary and he was not 
entitled to remuneration for that period.  No compensation should therefore have 
been awarded to the employee in respect of the period of his detention.   
 
The court found, further that the commissioner had awarded retrospective 
reinstatement for a period longer than 12 months prior to the date of finalization of 
the arbitration.  The employee was however only entitled to be reinstated 
retrospectively for a period no longer than 12 months.  The court accordingly 
corrected the CCMA award to provide for the retrospective reinstatement of the 
employee with effect from 8 March 2003. 
 
However, in Clarke v Mudan NO,35 the court seemed to have followed the legal 
position set out in Kroukam.36
In paragraph 14 Ngalwana AJ declared that a first and final warning would have been 
an appropriate sanction on the facts of this case and ordered the third respondent 
  The facts of this case were as follows:  the applicant 
employee had been dismissed by the third respondent, Edgars for processing a false 
cash transaction.  Her dismissal was upheld by the CCMA although it was clear from 
the evidence before the commissioner, inter alia, that the processing of fictitious cash 
transactions was a widespread practice in Edgars’ stores countrywide; that no-one 
had ever been dismissed for doing so, and that the practice had only been 
investigated by top management and prohibited after the dismissal of the employee. 
 
The court found that the commissioner had committed a reviewable irregularity in 
finding that the employee’s conduct constituted a dismissible offence.  The court 
distinguished this matter from those in which several employees were disciplined and 
given different sanctions for the same offence.  The court distinguished this matter 
from those in which several employees were disciplined and given different sanctions 
for the same offence.  In this matter the employee was the first to be dismissed for 
the conduct in issue, so the question of inconsistency of treatment did not arise. 
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employer to reinstate the applicant with retrospective effect to date of dismissal with 
all the remuneration to which the applicant would have been entitled had she not 
been dismissed. 
 
Once again the question of retrospective reinstatement came before Zondo JP in 
Oosthuizen v Telkom SA Ltd,37
The court found further that the fact that Telkom had not placed any evidence before 
the court below to explain why the appellant was not appointed to any of the 
positions he had applied for and for which he met the basic requirements and why 
 where the appellant employee was a specialist 
switching engineer with 30 years service with the respondent, Telkom.  He was a 
member of the SA Communications Union, but did not fall within the bargaining unit 
because of his seniority.  When Telkom decided to reduce the number of its 
employees, it consulted with the Alliance of Telkom Unions (ATU), of which SACU 
was a member union. Telkom and ATU reached an agreement on staff optimization 
which provided, inter alia, for the procedure to be followed when contemplating 
retrenchment and/or redundancies and procedures for avoiding or minimizing 
dismissals.  Employees whose positions were determined to be redundant were in 
terms of the agreement, to be offered a voluntary severance package or entry into a 
redeployment pool from which they could apply for vacancies and for which Telkom 
undertook to provide training, if required. 
 
When the appellant’s position was declared to be redundant, he elected to be placed 
in the redeployment pool.  Following his entry into the redeployment pool and until his 
retrenchment some five months later, the appellant applied unsuccessfully for 22 
vacancies in Telkom’s organization.  He also applied, again, unsuccessfully, for four 
vacancies after his retrenchment.  After conciliation failed before the CCMA, the 
appellant approached the Labour Court for relief but it dismissed his application. 
 
The court found that an employer has an obligation not to dismiss an employee for 
operational requirements if the, employer has work which such employee can 
perform, either without any additional training or with minimal training. 
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those positions had been given to other employees meant that Telkom had failed to 
justify the dismissal of the appellant. Telkom was obliged to explain the basis for its 
selection and to show that the selection criteria used was fair and objective.  In a 
separate, detailed judgement, Mc Call AJA also found that it had not been 
established before the court below that there were in fact no alternatives to dismissal 
or that the procedure adopted leading to the appellant’s dismissal had been fair and 
objective. 
 
The court was satisfied that Telkom had failed to prove that there was a fair reason 
for the selection of the appellant for retrenchment, and his dismissal was accordingly 
substantively unfair.  The court found that the reinstatement was the appropriate 
remedy, and ordered Telkom to reinstate the appellant retrospectively for a period of 
12 months from the date of the court order, until the date of his dismissal when he 
was in the redeployment pool.  The court further ordered that the appellant’s 
reinstatement was to give the respondent an opportunity to offer the appellant a 
specific position in its employ or to enable the appellant and the respondent to reach 
some other agreement about the future of the appellant in the respondent’s employ.   
 
The question of retrospective reinstatement came before the Supreme Court of 
Appeal for the first time in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Energy Printing 
Paper Wood & Allied Workers Union,38
The court found in favour of the workers and ordered that some of them be reinstated 
with effect from 7 September 1999, that others be paid 12 months compensation and 
that the same amount be paid into the estate of workers who had died before the 
trial.  The company’s application for leave to appeal was refused by both the Labour 
Court and the Labour Appeal Court.  The company then approached the Supreme 
 where the appellant company had retrenched 
about 150 workers on 6 September 1999.  Certain of the workers and their union 
contested the fairness of their dismissals before the Labour Court.  The matter came 
to trial some six years after the worker’s retrenchment.  The only issues before the 
Labour Court were whether the selection criteria used were fair and objective and the 
appropriate relief, if any.   
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Court of Appeal for leave to appeal directly to that court.  The company sought leave 
to appeal only against the order of reinstatement. 
 
The company raised two issues arising from the delay.  First, it contended that the 
reinstatement of 28 workers after the lapse of a period of six years was wholly 
inappropriate, and secondly, it contended that the order was in conflict with the 
decision in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd,39
In the court’s view this was such a case.  It found further that the passage of six 
years from the time the workers were dismissed which followed consequentially upon 
 
which held that the LRA had to be construed so that an order for reinstatement could 
not be given retrospective operation for longer than 12 months. 
 
The court disagreed with the LAC’s construction of the LRA in Latex.  The court did 
not opine that the backpay to which a worker ordinarily becomes entitled to when an 
order for reinstatement is made is to be equated with compensation.  It held that an 
order for reinstatement restores the former contract and any amount that was 
payable to the worker under that contract necessarily becomes due to the worker on 
that ground alone.  The court agreed with Davis AJA (in Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) 
Ltd) that the remuneration becomes due under the terms of the contract itself and 
does not constitute compensation as envisaged by section 194.  The court also found 
that there were no proper grounds for inferring that the limitation suggested in Latex 
was inadvertently omitted and ought to be read into the section. 
 
However, the court stated that the hallmark of the LRA is its insistence upon disputes 
concerning unfair dismissal being resolved expeditiously.  The court found that while 
the Act requires an order for reinstatement or re-employment generally to be made, a 
court or an arbitrator may decline to make such an order where it is “not reasonably 
practicable” for the employer to take the employee back into employment. Whether 
that is so depends on the particular circumstances, but in many cases the 
impracticability of resuming the relationship of employment increased with the 
passage of time. 
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the failure by the union to pursue the claim expeditiously was sufficient to find that it 
was not reasonably practicable to reinstate or re-employ the workers. 
 
Nugent JA stated in paragraph 22 of the judgment as follows: 
 
“The only alternative remedy that is available in the circumstances is an order 
that the company compensate the workers for their unfair dismissal.  That must 
necessarily be limited to 12 months’ remuneration and the company accepted 
that that would be appropriate.” 
 
On the analysis of the court’s findings in the Republican Press, it appears that it 
agreed with the LAC’s decision in Kroukam on the fact that a reinstatement order 
could operate retrospectively more than 12 or 24 months, whichever case may be, 
from the date of the arbitration or adjudication hearing.  However, it could not confirm 
the Labour Court's order for reinstatement due to the provisions of section 193(2)(c) 
of the LRA.  In this matter, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that the time the 
Labour Court made its order, the employer had undertaken further retrenchments 
and some of the company’s operations had been restructured. 
 
In my view, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of sections 193 and 194 of 
the LRA is in line with the literal meaning of the provisions of those sections as 
envisaged by the Legislature. 
 
The differing LAC decisions have resulted in confusion among the courts.  It also 
raised doubts about the specialised status of the LAC that ordinarily is deemed the 
champion of the objects of the LRA.  The conflicting LAC decisions seemed more to 
disable rather than enable the realisation of the objectives of the LRA. 
 
It was hoped by the players in the industrial relations arena, that the Republican 
Press decision in the SCA had fully and finally settled the law on retrospective 
reinstatement and compensation until the same question came before the 
Constitutional Court, which is the supreme court of the land. 
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In Equity Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA,40
On its appeal to the Constitutional Court, the company relied on Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union v Latex Surgical Products (Pty) Ltd
 the CCMA had found, on 18 March 
2002, that the dismissal of the third respondent employee for misconduct on 8 march 
2001 had been substantively and procedurally fair.  On review, the Labour Court 
found that the misconduct should have been corrected with progressive discipline.  
On 18 October 2004 it set aside the award and replaced it with an award that read: 
 
“The employee is to receive a final written warning to the effect that should he 
commit a similar transgression in the next two years, he may be dismissed 
immediately.” 
 
The applicant company appealed to the Labour Appeal Court, which observed in its 
judgment handed down on 15 June 2007 that the Labour Court had not expressly 
made an order of reinstatement after setting aside the award, although there was no 
doubt that the Labour Court was of the view that the CCMA ought to have ordered 
reinstatement. 
 
Regarding retrospectivity of a reinstatement order, the Labour Appeal Court found 
that retrospectivity could not be implied.  Since the employee had not noted a cross-
appeal against the Labour Court’s failure to make an order backdating the 
reinstatement to the date of his dismissal, the court concluded that the reinstatement 
order that the CCMA would have made should have run only from the date of the 
issuing of the award.  The court accordingly ordered, inter alia, that the order to 
reinstate the employee should operate from the date of issuing of the CCMA award.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the company’s application for leave to 
appeal against the judgment of the LAC.   
 
41
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 where the LAC held that it is 
not competent for a court or a tribunal to order retrospective operation of a 
reinstatement order in excess of 12 months.  The Constitutional Court noted that the 
central issues for consideration related to (1) the proper interpretation of section 
193(1)(a) of the LRA 1995 read with section 194, more pointedly whether these 
sections, correctly interpreted, limit the payment of backpay where a court orders 
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reinstatement or re-employment to a maximum of 12 months wages as contended by 
the company; (2) whether the LAC exercised a discretion in relation to the 
retrospectivity of the order and, if so, whether it failed to exercise its discretion 
properly; (3) whether remittal of the case to the LAC would constitute appropriate 
relief. 
 
The court noted that section 193 provides for three remedies a court or arbitrator may 
order after ruling that a dismissal is unfair.  They are reinstatement, re-employment 
or compensation.  A court must order reinstatement or re-employment unless one or 
more of the circumstances specified in section 193(2)(a) – (d) exist, in which case 
compensation may be granted depending on the nature of dismissal.  Relying on the 
established rules for interpretation of statutes, the court observed that the ordinary 
meaning of the word ‘reinstate’ is to put the employee back into the same job or 
position he or she occupied before dismissal, on the same terms and conditions. 
 
As the language of section 193(1)(a) indicates, the court noted, the extent of 
retrospectivity is dependent upon the exercise of a discretion by the court or 
arbitrator and that the only limitation in this regard is that the reinstatement cannot be 
fixed at a date earlier than the actual date of dismissal. 
 
The court rejected the company’s contention that an order for payment of 
retrospective remuneration is in effect an order of compensation and that the 
limitations imposed by section 194 should consequently apply to any award of 
backpay.  It considered the conflicting decisions of the LAC in Kroukam and Latex,42 
and found that the SCA clarified the position in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v 
Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union.43
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  The SCA held that 
the backpay to which a dismissed employee ordinarily becomes entitled when an 
order of reinstatement is made cannot be equated with compensation, thus allowing 
for the limitation contained in section 194 not to be applied in relation to backpay.  
Given the clear language used in section 193(1)(a) and the coherent legislative 
structure for the resolution of dismissal disputes in the LRA, the court found that the 
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interpretation in Republican Press in which the SCA endorsed the majority view in 
Kroukam, was correct. 
 
The company contended further that the remedies of reinstatement and re-
employment are not alternative remedies to compensation and they can be ordered 
simultaneously with it and that, in order to achieve fairness between employers and 
employees, the legislature had deemed it fit to “cap” the amount of remuneration, or 
backpay, to which the unfairly dismissed employee was entitled on reinstatement.  
The court found that the language of section 193(1)(a) is not amenable to this 
construction.  The sum of money paid to an unfairly dismissed employee subsequent 
to an order of reinstatement with retrospective effect is not compensation as 
contemplated in section 193(1)(c) or section 194.  The court found that the remedies 
in section 193(1) are thus in the alternative and mutually exclusive. 
 
A distinction has to be drawn between the remedies of reinstatement and 
compensation provided for in section 193(1)(a) and (c) respectively, so as to 
understand the scope of the limits on compensation under section 194.  It might well 
be that the limits on compensation seek to curtail the employer’s financial risk when 
confronted with an unfair dismissal claim.  In the case of reinstatement or re-
employment the statute provides two mechanisms for the management of such 
concerns:  first, section 193(2)(c) provides that the remedies of reinstatement or re-
employment need not be ordered if the court or commissioner is satisfied that it 
would not be reasonably practicable for the employer to reinstate or re-employ the 
employee, and second, the statute provides that the court or commissioner has a 
discretion to determine the extent of retrospectivity of the order of reinstatement or 
re-employment.  In exercising this discretion, the court or commissioner may 
address, among other things, the period between the dismissal and the trial as well 
as the fact that the dismissed employee was without income during the period of 
dismissal ensuring, however, that the employer is not unjustly financially burdened if 
retrospective reinstatement is ordered or awarded. 
 
The court held that, the capping in section 194 has no bearing on retrospective 
reinstatement.  It is only when reinstatement or re-employment is not ordered that 
compensation in terms of section 194 may be ordered to a maximum of 12 or 24 
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months remuneration depending on the nature of the dismissal.  It held further that, it 
is competent to make a reinstatement order that requires an employer to pay 
backpay for more than 12 months. 
 
The court dismissed the company’s contention that the LAC should have exercised 
its discretion to determine the date from which reinstatement order was effective on 
the grounds that the issue had not been raised by the company in its notice of appeal 
or its argument before the LAC.  The court also rejected the company’s call for the 
matter to be remitted to the LAC on the grounds that there was no legal or factual 
basis for granting such an order.  The majority court accordingly dismissed the 
appeal with costs. 
 
In a minority judgement Yacoob J (Langa CJ and Van der Westhuizen J concurring) 
was of the view that the prospects of success were so bad that it would not be in the 
interests of justice to grant leave to appeal.  He found that the conclusion in the 
majority judgment presupposed that an order of retrospective reinstatement had 
been made by the courts below.  However, on a proper construction, the 
reinstatement order had never been retrospective and thus the question whether and 
the extent to which retrospective reinstatement was permitted by the LRA did not 
arise in this matter.  The minority court, accordingly, dismissed the application for 
leave to appeal. 
 
3.3 RE-EMPLOYMENT 
 
The LRA does not specify the circumstances in which re-employment should be 
ordered, rather than reinstatement.  Nor is the term defined in the Act.  In 
Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v President of the Industrial Court,44
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 it was 
held that re-employment must accordingly be given its ordinary meaning:  the 
employees begin work afresh with the employer and any benefits arising from their 
past employment are not extended to the new employment relationship. 
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The difference between reinstatement and re-employment is not explained, however, 
reinstatement in its ordinary meaning suggests that the period of service between 
dismissal and resumption of service is deemed unbroken; re-employment, on the 
other hand, suggests that the employment contract ended at the date of dismissal 
and resumed on the date of re-employment.  It seems that re-employment was 
offered as an alternative to dismissal to cater for the forms of dismissal in which the 
employment relationship had terminated before the dismissal – ie where the 
employee was the victim of selective non-re-employment or where the employer 
refused to renew a fixed-term contract.   
 
Employees or their unions are entitled to be consulted on, and the employer is 
obliged to provide information concerning, the possibility of the future re-employment 
of the employees to be dismissed.  The provisions regarding retrenchment do not 
expressly oblige the employer either to make such an offer or to honour it should 
future vacancies arise.  However, section 186(1)(d) provides that a refusal by an 
employer which has dismissed a number of employees for the same or similar 
reasons to re-employ some of them is deemed a dismissal. Employees who have 
been refused re-employment can thus challenge their non-re-employment as an 
unfair dismissal.  An employer that re-hires only some of a group of retrenchees may 
therefore have to defend its decision not to re-employ the remainder on operational 
grounds. 
 
It is an unfair labour practice to fail or refuse to reinstate or re-employ a former 
employee contrary to an agreement.  In OCGAWU v First Pro Engineering,45
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 the 
respondent company manufactured components for the motor industry.  After the 
cancellation of certain contracts the company undertook a retrenchment exercise, 
during which three of the applicant employees were retrenched.  On 12 February 
2002 the company and the union signed an agreement in terms of which the 
company agreed “when engaging employees during the subsequent 36 months, to 
give preference, as far as is practicable, to the re-engagement of those employees 
who are retrenched”. In April 2003, more employees, including six of the applicant 
employees, accepted voluntary retrenchment. 
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Later in 2003, the respondent began to increase its workforce again, and the nine 
applicant employees were not re-employed as they did not reach the level of skills 
then prescribed by the respondent.  The arbitrator looked first at the scope of the 
agreement and found that, given a wide interpretation, it covered all the applicant 
employees, including those who took voluntary retrenchment in April 2003.   
 
The arbitrator then looked at the agreement as a whole to ascertain the intention of 
the parties.  Under the heading “Selection Criteria” the agreement stipulated that 
commercial and economic factors and the employer’s operational requirements 
would be taken into account, including the employee’s service, knowledge and skills.  
On the word “practicable”, the arbitrator found that it had to be interpreted to mean 
that the employees were able to perform work although lacking the theoretical 
knowledge. 
 
The applicant’s had been invited to meet the new criteria but were unsuccessful.  On 
the evidence the arbitrator could not find that the agreement guaranteed the 
employees re-employment.  The introduction of selection criteria was permitted, and 
the applicants were not entitled to automatic re-employment before new employees 
who had the necessary skills. 
 
Therefore, whether a rehiring agreement is satisfied obviously depends on the 
wording of the agreement – provisions which impose an obligation to rehire “if 
practicable” or if the employees are suitably qualified, or which require the employer 
merely to consider retrenchees for employment, do not impose an obligation to re-
employ if those conditions are not satisfied. 
 
With regards to fixed-term contacts, if the parties agreed at the outset that the 
contract of employment was for a specific period, the contract terminates at the end 
of that period.  Notice is not required to effect the termination.  An employer may 
terminate a fixed-term contract before the agreed date of termination only if the 
employee is in material breach. 
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Otherwise, premature termination constitutes a repudiation by the employer, for 
which the employee may in principle claim damages equivalent to the salary he or 
she would have received until the date of termination or end of the contract as it was 
stated in Buthelezi v Municipal Dermacation Board,46
Fixed-term contracts may be tacitly renewed by the conduct of the parties.  One 
judgment suggests that where this occurs there is a rebuttable presumption that the 
contract is on the same terms and for the same period as the original contract.  
However, the sounder view is that unless anything is said to the contrary the new 
contract is of indefinite duration.  If a fixed-term contract has been frequently 
renewed, and the parties do not specify that the renewal shall be for a further specific 
period, it will generally be assumed that as far as the parties are concerned the 
contract has become one for an indefinite period.  The labour courts held under the 
1956 LRA that, even when a fixed-term contract had expired, non-renewal could 
constitute unfair labour practice.  See Food & General Workers Union v Lanko Co-
operative Ltd.
 where the employer 
prematurely terminated a fixed-term contract of employment based on its operational 
requirements. 
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3.4 COMPENSATION 
  The current LRA expressly provides that failure by an employer to 
renew a fixed-term contact, or its renewal on less favourable terms, constitutes a 
dismissal if the employee reasonably expected renewal. 
 
The court or the arbitrator also has a discretion to order re-employment in the case of 
unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice, however, a new contract of employment is 
concluded between the employer and the employee for the latter to occupy the 
position it held before the dismissal or in other reasonably suitable work on any terms 
and from any date not earlier than the date of dismissal. 
 
 
The amended section 194 eliminated the distinction between compensation for 
procedurally and substantively unfair dismissals, but it preserved the ceiling of 24 
months compensation for automatically unfair dismissals.  The higher compensation 
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for automatically unfair dismissal indicates that the legislature intended to arm the 
courts with power to order punitive damages in such cases. 
 
It was held in CEPWAWU v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC48
In Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union,
 that the amount of 
compensation awarded for an automatically unfair dismissal must reflect the fact that, 
save in exceptional circumstances, the employee would be entitled to fully 
retrospective reinstatement, not only to ensure that the employee lost nothing as a 
result of the dismissal but also to penalise the employer for dismissing the employee 
for a prohibited reason. Where reinstatement is not requested, compensation should 
be calculated accordingly. 
 
I will now deal with the question of compensation in cases decided by our courts on 
unfair retrenchment. 
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 the court 
held that the provisions of section 189 placed formal primary obligations on the 
employer in terms of various subsections, but that these were geared towards the 
specific purpose of attempting to reach consensus.  This joint consensus seeking 
process could be frustrated by the employer or the employee. 
 
The court held that the proper approach to any investigation into compliance with 
section 189 must be to examine whether such frustration of the purpose of the 
section had taken place and, if so, by whom.  A finding of non-compliance by the 
employer would almost invariably result in a finding that the dismissal was 
procedurally unfair, although not necessarily substantively unfair. 
 
The court found that in this case, although the dismissal had been procedurally unfair 
for want of compliance with section 189 regarding selection criteria for retrenchment, 
the employer had made good its failure properly to discuss selection criteria soon 
after its final decision to retrench but that the union and the employees had been 
unreasonably obstinate in refusing to discuss this criteria.  The court accordingly 
found that the employees were not entitled to compensation under section 194(1).  
 40 
 
The most important aspect of this judgment is that a court or arbitrator has a 
discretion whether to award compensation or not.  Froneman DJP stated in 
paragraph 40 as follows: 
 
“If compensation is awarded it must be in accordance with the formula set out in 
section 194(1), nothing more, nothing less. The discretion not to award 
compensation in the particular circumstances of a case must, be exercised 
judicially.” 
 
In Scribante v Avgold Ltd (Hartebeesfontein Division),50 the court following Johnson 
& Johnson,51
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51  Supra. 
 held that the relevant factors to be taken into account in determining 
whether or note to award compensation are the following: 
 
(1) whether the employer has already provided the employee with substantially the 
same kind of redress; 
 
(2) whether the employer’s ability and willingness to make that redress is frustrated 
by the conduct of the employee; 
 
(3) the degree that the employer deviated from the requirements of a fair 
procedure; and 
 
(4) whether the employer secured alternative employment for the employee. 
 
The court was satisfied that it was not appropriate to take into account the actual loss 
sustained by the employee, whether the employee successfully obtained alternative 
employment immediately after the dismissal, whether the employee did or did not 
mitigate his loss, and the period that it would have taken to effect a fair dismissal.  
The court was also satisfied that factors such as length of service, prospects of 
finding alternative employment and the financial position of the employer are not 
relevant factors. 
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In NUMSA v Dorbyl Ltd,52
In Nkopane v Independent Electoral Commission,
 Fulton AJ considered the extent to which the union failed 
to comply with its obligations under section 189(2)(a)(i) and 6 and found that it would 
be just and equitable in the circumstances to award the retrenched employees 
compensation equal to two months remuneration.   
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In Lakomski v TTS Tool Technic Systems (Pty) Ltd,
 the court concluded that the 
respondent had no lawful basis, and therefore acted unfairly in its premature 
termination of the fixed-term contracts of employment of the applicants.  Regarding 
appropriate relief, the court was of the view that the appropriate and fairest measure 
of compensation was an amount equivalent to the applicant’s remuneration for the 
remaining period of their employment contracts, from which the severance packages 
they had received had to be deducted. 
 
However, the court’s assessment of the issue of compensation appears to be in 
conflict with the provisions of section 195 which provides that an order or award of 
compensation made in terms of Chapter VIII is in addition to, and not substitute for, 
any other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective 
agreement or contract of employment.   
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 the court after finding that 
employee’s retrenchment was both, substantively and procedurally unfair, observed 
that the employee found employment within days of her retrenchment at a higher 
salary than that paid to her by the company and that she did not suffer any 
patrimonial loss.  However, the court found, that the test in deciding whether 
compensation should be granted is not whether the employee has suffered 
patrimonial loss.  That is a factor that the court may take into account.  Other factors 
include, inter alia, how the employee was treated and what steps the employer took 
to comply with the provisions of the Act.  The court found, in the circumstances, that 
it was just and equitable to award the applicant five months compensation together 
with her costs. 
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In Rowmoor Investment (Pty) Ltd v Wilson,55 where the company raised the issue 
that the award was reviewable because the commissioner failed to provide reasons 
for awarding 12 months compensation for unfair retrenchment, Molahlehi J, relying 
on Almalgamated Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Grobler NO56 and Bezuidenhout v Johnston 
NO,57
In Transnet Ltd v CCMA,
 stated in paragraph 43 as follows: 
 
“In considering whether failure to provide reasons for the relief provided, the 
court is required to determine from the commissioner’s finding whether he or she 
anticipated the remedy or the basis for the remedy is apparent from the record.” 
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 the court was asked to deal with the measure of 
compensation in circumstances where the third respondent, a senior employee of the 
applicant was dismissed from his employment after he committed a serious assault 
upon his wife at the workplace, as a result of which she suffered grievous bodily 
harm.  In the proceedings before the CCMA the commissioner found the dismissal to 
be substantively fair but procedurally unfair and awarded the employee 
compensation equal to six month’s remuneration. 
 
In the court’s view the commissioner arrived at a finding that was entirely 
disconnected from the evidence to such an extent that it could not be said that his 
conclusion was one that a reasonable decision maker would have reached. 
 
On the question of compensation, the court found it clear that the commissioner had 
absolutely no regard to the seriousness and the highly offensive nature of the 
employee’s misconduct in arriving at the quantum of compensation, particularly in the 
light of the fact he had found on the evidence that the employee had seriously 
assaulted a co-employee who was also his wife.  In the court’s view this was one of 
the circumstances where the commissioner should have concluded that the 
reprehensible nature of the offence outweighed any consideration of compensation 
and that it was not “just and equitable” to have awarded compensation. 
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The issue of measure of compensation and damages came before Pillemer AJ in 
Wallace v Du Toit59
In Christian v Colliers Properties,
 where he found that the applicant’s dismissal was automatically 
unfair in terms of section 187(1)(e) and further found that there was unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy in terms of 56(1) of the Employment 
Equity Act as it was not an inherent requirement of the job of an au pair that the 
incumbent must not be pregnant or a parent. 
 
On the appropriate measure of damages to be awarded, the court made a single 
award in relation to the solatium element under the LRA and the damage’s claim 
under the EEA.  An amount of R24 000.00 was regarded as a fair solatium for the 
impairment of the applicant’s dignity and self-esteem, in addition to compensation for 
patrimonial loss based on 12 months’ remuneration. 
 
However, the court’s award of compensation for patrimonial loss is open to criticism 
when one has regard to other Labour Court’s decisions which ruled that actual 
patrimonial loss is not to be taken into account when assessing compensation to be 
awarded to unfairly dismissed employees. 
 
My discussion will now look into the court’s assessment of compensation in cases 
envisaged under section 194(3) of the LRA. 
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 the applicant’s dismissal was found to be 
automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(f) and she was awarded compensation 
of 24 months remuneration and payment of damages in terms of section 50(1)(e) of 
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  The court noted that, by providing for 
compensation in excess of that which may be awarded in cases of other dismissals, 
the legislature’s clear intention in section 194(3) was the eradication of the categories 
of automatically unfair dismissal laid down in section 187(1) and the protection of 
workers against such dismissal.  The compensation that can be awarded has a 
punitive and preventative element. 
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The court further noted that it mattered not whether the applicant’s employment had 
been of short duration as newly appointed and long established employees were 
equally vulnerable in situations of sexual harassment and therefore equally deserving 
of protection.  The court found that the calculating manner in which Mr C effected the 
applicant’s dismissal was an aggravating factor and he compounded the gravity of 
the situation by seeking to justify the dismissal on a false pretext. 
 
In Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd,61
In Food & Allied Workers Union v The Cold Chain,
 the court found that the applicant’s 
dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair as contemplated in section 
187(1)(c) and (h).  Regarding the appropriate remedy, the court held that the 
applicant’s dismissal was a sham and the company used her health condition in 
order to rid itself of an employee who proved to be diligent and committed to the 
execution of her duties, and it awarded her 24 months compensation. 
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In Viney v Barnard Jacobs Mellet Securities (Pty) Ltd,
 where the applicant’s dismissal 
was found to be automatically unfair as envisaged in section 187(1)(f) as a result of 
refusing to relinquish his position as a shop steward when he was appointed to a 
higher graded position, Nel J noted that the applicant employee did not seek 
reinstatement for undisclosed personal reasons not related to any conduct of the 
employer, and he stated that since he would have ordered the retrospective 
reinstatement of the employee, he was of the view that it would be just and equitable 
to award him the equivalent compensation of nine months’ remuneration. 
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 where the court found that 
the dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(g), it made 
reference to decided case law which prescribed that in determining appropriate relief, 
consideration should be given to the interests of both employee and employer, to 
seriousness of the unfairness and the nature of the constitutional infringement.  The 
court found that the contravention of section 187(1)(g) had been exacerbated by the 
unfair treatment meted out to the employee prior to his dismissal, and also took into 
account that he secured alternative employment soon after his dismissal.  The court 
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ordered the respondent to pay the applicant compensation equivalent to a period of 
18 months’ remuneration at the applicant’s rate of remuneration at the date of his 
dismissal. 
 
In Sekgobela v State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd,64
The refusal to accept the reinstatement offer may impact upon the employee’s 
entitlement to compensation.  In Mkhonto v Ford NO,
 the court found the 
applicant’s dismissal to be automatically unfair for having made a protected 
disclosure as contemplated in section 187(1)(h) of the Act.  On the appropriate relief, 
the court was of the view that it would be just and equitable to order the maximum 
compensation allowed for by the Act, equivalent to 24 months’ salary.  Basson J 
stated as follows in paragraph 33 of his judgment: 
 
“The applicant was the typical victim of an occupational detriment who dared to 
question the modus operandi of his employer and his colleagues.  What makes 
this matter worse is the fact that the respondent is a state organ who is entrusted 
with public funds and trusted by the public to adhere to accountable procurement 
policies.  An employee should not be subjected to an occupational detriment if he 
discloses information that exposes a public entity for not complying with its legal 
obligations and responsibilities.” 
 
My discussion will now focus on the court’s assessment of compensation in unfair 
dismissals as envisaged in section 194(1) of the Act. 
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The same principle set out in Mkhonto
 it was held that, fairness is 
the guiding principle in determining whether or not to compensate an employee who 
refuses to accept the reinstatement offer, and it was held, further that, the appellant’s 
refusal to accept the reinstatement offer was grossly unreasonable. 
 
66 was followed in Technikon SA v Mojela,67
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where the employee did not take up an offer of reinstatement and the court ordered 
that the employee was not entitled to any compensation arising out of his dismissal. 
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In Le Monde Luggage CC t/a Pakwells Petje v Dunn NO,68
In Tibbett & Britten (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Marks,
 where the employee 
claimed constructive dismissal, after she resigned following an assault by the 
employer, the court found that there was some merit in the store’s argument that it 
was not just and equitable to award 12 month’s compensation where both the 
employee’s and the owner’s conduct had contributed to the deterioration of the 
employment relationship over a period of time.  However, the court found that it 
cannot be sympathetic to employers who assault employees.  Such an assault is an 
agregiously wrongful act.  The court found that the award of 12 months 
compensation was not punitive, but was clearly justifiable on the basis of the nature 
of the wrongful act committed by the owner which was the key event which gave rise 
to the unfair dismissal. 
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In Boxer Superstores (Pty) Ltd v Zuma,
 the court found that the employee’s 
dismissal for unauthorised use of her company credit card was substantively fair but 
procedurally unfair and the arbitrator by granting the employee compensation equal 
to 12 months salary was indeed rewarding her for misconduct.  Revelas J held that, 
in the absence of rational justification for the award, it must be accepted that the 
arbitrator did not exercise her discretion in a judicial manner, or at all, and the award 
was set aside on the ground.  In the court’s view, compensation in an amount equal 
to six months salary was fair in the circumstances. 
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On appeal, the court noted that section 193(2) mandates an arbitrator or the court to 
examine the factors set out in the section in order to craft a remedy.  The court 
agreed that the court below had not engaged with the requirements of section 193(2) 
 the commissioner had found the 
employee’s dismissal to be substantively unfair but procedurally fair and awarded 
compensation amounting to three months remuneration.  On review, the Labour 
Court found that once the commissioner had found that the employer had failed to 
discharge the onus of proving the substantive fairness of the dismissal, the only 
appropriate remedy was to order reinstatement of the employee. 
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but had simply concluded that the only appropriate remedy was to reinstate.  The 
court observed that the enquiry required an engagement with the requirements of 
section 193(2) and the evidence before the court as to the nature of the relationship 
between the parties. 
 
Regarding the question of appropriate relief, the court found that the award was 
irrational because the arbitrator gave no reasons for awarding compensation after 
having found the employee’s dismissal to be substantively unfair.  The court further 
found that there was thus no evidence before it or the court a quo, which would justify 
a court to substitute a decision taken by the arbitrator and replace it with its own.  
The Labour Court’s judgment was set aside on appeal and the matter was remitted to 
the arbitrator to record his reasons for the remedy and determine an appropriate 
remedy. 
 
It is debatable, whether this case is not in conflict with a Labour Court judgment in 
Rowmoor Investment (Pty) Ltd v Wilson,71
In Greater Letaba Local Municipality v Mankgabe NO,
 where Molahlehi J found that the court is 
required to determine from the arbitrator’s findings of fact whether he or she 
anticipated the remedy.  It is probable that it was due to the fact the court did not 
have evidence on record to support the arbitrator’s findings on compensation, which 
led the court to adopt a different approach from that used by Molahlehi J. 
 
72
                                                 
71  Supra. 
72  (2008) 29 ILJ 1167 (LC). 
 the employee’s dismissal 
was found to be substantively fair but procedurally unfair because he was not 
afforded an opportunity to address the executive committee in defence of the 
recommendation in his favour and that the executive committee was not competent 
to nullify the sanction recommended by the chairperson because the collective 
agreement provided that a determination by a disciplinary tribunal was final and 
binding on the municipality.  The court upheld the review application and awarded the 
employee two months compensation. 
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In Amazwi Power Products (Pty) Ltd v Turnbull,73
In Solidarity obo Kerns v Madau NO,
 the employee, a financial director 
resigned from the board of directors and indicated her intentions of serving the 
company as an ordinary employee.  The board accepted her resignation in total and 
advised her not to return to work.  On appeal, the court confirmed the Labour Court’s 
decision to award the employee a sum of R247 800.00, being the equivalent of six 
months salary, based on the employee’s salary as at the date of dismissal.  The 
employee was therefore awarded an equivalent of a salary of a financial director, the 
position she occupied on the date of her dismissal. 
 
The remedies for unfair dismissal are also provided for residual unfair labour 
practices as envisaged in section 193(4) and 194(4), which rest on the principles of 
reasonableness, fairness and equity. 
 
It will be demonstrated below, through case law, on how the arbitrators and the 
courts have to approach the assessment of remedies for unfair labour practices. 
 
74
Until his early retirement, the employee had been expected to perform the functions 
of the post of committee officer and those of manager human resources, but he was 
 following the merger of two municipalities, the 
employee previously employed as the senior personnel officer, was placed in the 
post of committee officer on the same terms, conditions and remuneration as those 
applicable to him in his former post as senior personnel officer.  The employee 
objected that this placement constituted a demotion. 
 
The court noted that the juridical concept of demotion did not necessarily require that 
one should suffer financial loss or loss of benefits for a demotion to eventuate, 
demotion could also occur where status, job content, responsibility and promotion 
prospects were prejudiced.  The court found that the employer's failure to address 
the employee’s objection to his placement constituted a breach of the resolution and 
collective agreement and constituted an unfair labour practice for which the 
employee was entitled to maximum compensatory relief in terms of section 194(4).  
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not remunerated for the higher post.  The employee was accordingly awarded 
compensation of 12 months, representing the difference between his salary and that 
applicable to the manager human resources. 
 
With regards to the unfair labour practice relating to promotion, the Labour Appeal 
Court's judgment in Department of Justice v CCMA,75
In Polokwane Local Municipality v SA Local Government Bargaining Council,
 is instructive in that regard.  
The court accepted that the employee’s complaint was that the department had not 
appointed him to the post on a permanent basis and that this constituted an unfair 
labour practice.  The court found that the decision of the commissioner that the 
department had made a final decision to appoint or promote the employee was not 
based on the evidence before him and was completely unjustified.  The court found 
that the employee should have waited until a final decision had been made to fill the 
post on a permanent basis before initiating the arbitration proceedings. 
 
76
The court found that the employee had no existing right ex contractu or ex lege to be 
paid an acting allowance and prior to August 2004 to be paid a standby allowance.  
 the 
employee referred a dispute to the bargaining council alleging that the municipality 
committed an unfair labour practice (a) by not paying her a standby allowance from 
October 2001 to July 2004 and (b) by not re-evaluating her position and upgrading 
her post from level 8 to level 6 and compensating her accordingly with effect from 
January 1997.   
 
The court noted that the grading or evaluation of a post was a matter of mutual 
interest.  The fact that the employee had acted in a post for a long time or performed 
a function of a higher post did not create an obligation on the municipality to promote 
her or to upgrade the employee’s post from level 8 to level 6.  The bargaining council, 
the court noted, only had jurisdiction to entertain an unfair labour practice dispute 
relating to the provisions of benefits where those benefits arose ex contractu or ex 
lege. 
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The court also upheld the municipality’s submission that the bulk of the employee's 
claim had prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
 
It is also important to note that in unfair labour practice disputes relating to promotion, 
an arbitrator cannot order promotion, which is equivalent to reinstatement, where the 
fairness of the labour practice only relates to the issue of procedure.  For example, in 
SA Police Service v Safety & Security Sectoral Bargaining Council,77
For example, in Minister of Justice and another v Bosch NO,
 the court noted 
that the fact that the applicant allegedly reneged on its undertaking to remove 
Director Nevling from the interviewing panel did not render its conduct unfair, and 
that the arbitrator’s finding to the contrary was not reasonable.  From the records of 
the interview the third respondent never raised any objection or sought the recusal of 
Director Nevling. 
 
The court found that the remedy of promotion ordered was inconsistent with the 
arbitrator’s finding that the process was procedurally flawed.  Therefore, section 
193(2) prevented the arbitrator from ordering promotion, which has the effect of a 
reinstatement.  Moshoana AJ stated in paragraph 16 of his judgment as follows: 
  
“He did not make a finding that the third respondent was the best candidate on 
the merits and that he deserves to be appointed.  At best a reasonable term 
would have been to set aside the appointment and order the assessment without 
the participation of Dr Nevling.  In the court's view he exceeded his powers in that 
regard.” 
 
Another important point relating to unfair labour practice is in dispute of unfair 
demotion and provision of benefits and the compensatory relief thereof.  
 
78
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 the employee, a 
senior administrative clerk, had been appointed to act as an assistant Magistrate in 
terms of section 9(4) of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944.  His appointment was 
temporary and had to be renewed once a month by the chief magistrate.  In January 
2000 the department issued a directive withdrawing the chief magistrate’s discretion 
to appoint the employee as a judicial officer.  The arbitrator found that the department 
 51 
had committed an unfair labour practice relating to the demotion of and the 
provisions of benefits to the employee. 
 
The Labour Court noted that, since the question whether the directive by the 
department constituted a demotion was not an agreed ground of review, it was 
unable to determine the matter.  However, if it were, the court would have found the 
decision reviewable and would have ruled that the department’s conduct did not 
constitute a demotion.  The court found that the arbitrator’s finding that the 
subsistence and travel allowance constituted a benefit was reviewable as 
subsistence and travel is paid only in circumstances where an employee is required 
to perform his or her duties at a place other than the office at which he or she is 
stationed. 
 
The court observed that damages are awarded as either patrimonial or sentimental 
damages and in order to succeed with a claim for sentimental damages, the party 
seeking such damages must establish that a wrong has been committed and that 
that wrong constitutes an injuria.  Having found that the action of the department did 
not amount to an unfair demotion, it followed that in the absence of a wrong the 
employee was not entitled to sentimental damages. 
 
In MEC for Tourism & Environmental & Economic Affairs:  Free State v Nondumo,79
The court, correctly in my view, found that the commissioner had clearly misdirected 
himself when he ordered reinstatement, compensation and arrear payments in one 
award. It is clear from the reading of section 193(4) that reinstatement and re-
employment are exclusive remedies to compensation when an arbitrator determines 
 
the respondent employee was suspended, first with pay and later without pay, 
following criminal charges for fraud which gave rise to disciplinary charges.  He 
referred an unfair labour practice dispute to the CCMA and the commissioner found 
his suspension to have been substantively and procedurally unfair, and ordered the 
reinstatement of the employee, 18 months’ outstanding salary and benefits and 12 
months’ compensation in terms of section 194(4) of the LRA.  
 
                                                 
79  (2005) 26 ILJ 1337 (LC). 
 52 
any unfair labour practice disputes.  The court also, correct in my view, found that the 
employer was not obliged to pay the employee arrear salary beyond the termination 
date of the fixed-term contract and it ordered 9 months arrear salary.  The court was 
also correct in finding that the employee was entitled to his outstanding salary in 
terms of section 195, in addition to an award of compensation. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
On a purposive interpretation of section 193, it is clear that the legislature intended to 
give a Labour Court or an arbitrator a discretion, where there is an unfair dismissal to 
order reinstatement, re-employment or compensation.  What is also clear from the 
content of this section is that reinstatement and re-employment are the primary 
remedies for an unfair dismissal.  This is in line with the purposes of the Labour 
Relations Act, which is to advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of the 
Act.80
I am of the view that the legislature had a rationale for formulation of a policy 
framework, by treating the remedies for unfair dismissal as exclusive, in order not to 
expose the employers who face claims for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice 
to huge financial exposure when they redress wrongs made to individual employees. 
 
 
The word “or” after section 193(1)(b) indicates that the remedy of compensation 
cannot be ordered together with reinstatement and re-employment as these are 
exclusive remedies.  Some arbitrators, have on occasion, treated these remedies as 
inclusive and their awards have been correctly, in my view, set aside on review by 
the Labour Court.  In order to properly interpret section 193, the rules of interpretation 
have to be adhered to, by giving the provisions of the statute their ordinary and literal 
meaning, unless that interpretation would lead to absurdity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
What is clear from the reading of section 193 of the Act is that the court or an 
arbitrator has a discretion on the remedy to be awarded in cases of unfair dismissal 
and unfair labour practice, however, that discretion must be exercised in a judicial 
manner in the interests of fairness and equity. The present legislative framework has 
been in place since 2002 and the Legislature has not indicated an intention to amend 
our law of unfair dismissal. However, it would be interesting to see, if the organised 
business would raise any proposals for legislative changes in the remedies for unfair 
dismissal, in light of the latest decision by the Constitutional Court in the Equity 
Aviation case. 
 
The employers face a huge financial risk in cases, where the courts or arbitrators 
order a retrospective reinstatement of an unfairly dismissed employee. It is therefore 
very important that the employers attempt to resolve a dismissal dispute as soon as 
the possibly can so that they may avoid to face a financial risk. On the other hand, 
the employees should pursue their claims for unfair dismissal in an expeditious 
manner so that there would be no delay that would be attributed to them and lessen 
an award of retrospective reinstatement in cases where their dismissal is found to be 
substantively and procedurally unfair. 
 
I am of the view that the SCA’s decision in the Republican Press and the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in the Equity Aviation were correctly decided due to 
the fact that the intention of the Legislature is clear on the wording of section 
193(1)(a), which gives a court or an arbitrator a discretion to order reinstatement of 
an employee to a date not earlier than the date of dismissal. I do not foresee any 
problems in interpreting the section in the manner adopted by the courts because the 
discretion must be exercised by looking at the circumstances of each case and by 
conducting an enquiry in terms of section 193(2)(a) to (d) to ascertain whether or not 
reinstatement would be an appropriate remedy. 
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On the factors to be considered on the appropriate compensation to be awarded to 
an unfairly dismissed employee, I submit that the most important factors to be 
considered are the following: the seriousness of the infringement of the employee’s 
rights, the steps taken by the employer in order to redress the wrongs made, the 
employee’s unreasonable refusal of an offer of reinstatement, and the interests of 
fairness and equity. The other important factor highlighted by the Labour Court in the 
analysis of a commissioner’s findings of fact is that an award is not reviewable 
because there are no reasons stated in the award for awarding compensation, where 
in his findings of fact, the commissioner anticipated the appropriate remedy. 
 
I fully agree with the court’s approach in this regard as section 138(7)(a) provides 
that the commissioner must issue an arbitration award with brief reasons, signed by 
the commissioner. The reasons for the award would certainly be found in the 
commissioner’s findings of fact. 
 
The area which seems to be a grey area to some extent is the unfair labour practice 
disputes relating to promotion and provision of benefits to employees. The courts 
have set out clear that employees do not have an automatic right to promotion as 
they have to contest with other candidates for the advertised position. However, in 
some cases the courts have ordered that the non-appointment of an employee who 
acted in a higher position to transfer skills and equip him for that position, constituted 
an unfair labour practice. The whole process revolves around the principle of 
legitimate expectation. 
 
The problem with the provision of benefits is that if there is no existing right to the 
benefits, it is a matter of mutual interest which must be resolved by collective 
bargaining and power play, which leads to the exploitation of a single or few 
employees. I am of the view that, if an employee could show a legitimate expectation 
to the provision of benefits, his or her dispute must be arbitrated or adjudicated. 
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